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The formation of a crater by the abrupt and catastrophic rupture of a high-pressure pipeline 
can be highly relevant, especially when the crater uncovers other pipelines, which could 
undergo a domino effect with a significant increase of the consequences on people or on 
the environment. However, this scenario has been only partially studied in the literature. 
To assess the influence of the pipeline parameters on the dimensions of the resulting crater, 
a statistical analysis of accidental ruptures of buried natural gas pipelines that have 
involved the formation of a crater was carried out. Mathematical expressions are proposed 
to describe the proportionality relationships found, which can be very useful to support 
adequate separation distances in the design and construction of parallel corridors of 
pipelines after appropriate escalating effects are considered. Finally, detailed event trees 
were developed to calculate the probability of occurrence of the final outcomes, as well as 
the identified domino sequences, based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
data. The study of these accident scenarios, based on actual cases, represents a useful and 
needed advance in risk analysis of natural gas transportation through pipelines. 
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1. Introduction  
 
High population growth and rapid industrialization around the world have led to a 
substantial increase in the consumption of Natural Gas (NG). Consequently, the NG 
transportation through high-pressure pipelines to ever-greater distances has also been 
increased (EGIG, 2015). According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 
2017), the world consumption of NG increased due to rapid economic growth from 1499 
billion cubic meters (BCM) in 1980 to 3476 BCM in 2014, representing an increase of 
132%. To address this challenge, the gas industry usually maximizes its transport capacity 
by increasing the operating pressure of the system or by installing more pipelines, often 
parallel or crossing to existing ones. These pipelines transport gas or oil over great 
distances and sometimes they are closely separated between them, which imply a particular 
risk associated with the potential interaction of these systems (Acton et al., 2010; Wang et 
al., 2011). In these situations, a Loss of Containment (LOC) may affect a close pipeline or 
other structure located around the site of an accident, aggravating the corresponding 
consequences of the event. This type of events has happened in different accidents with 
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severe consequences on people or with significant material and economic losses (Ramírez-
Camacho et al., 2015).   
 
Due to its physical and chemical characteristics, NG presents several risk scenarios 
depending on whether it is ignited or not. If it ignites immediately after the release, a jet 
fire will occur. If there is no ignition, the gas will disperse into the atmosphere as toxic 
dispersion. A flash fire or a gas cloud explosion, followed by a jet fire, is possible if the 
ignition is delayed. These risk scenarios also depend on the release mode (i.e., full-bore 
rupture, leak/puncture), as well as the volume of gas released, the meteorological 
conditions at the time of the accident, and the characteristics of the surroundings (i.e., 
urban, rural). Therefore, to ensure the integrity of NG pipelines, it is necessary to 
rigorously evaluate all possible hazardous scenarios and their consequences, mainly on 
people but also on the environment, because safety and environmental impact must have 
absolute priority over the demand of NG.  
 
About the possible accidental scenarios that can occur as a result of buried NG pipelines, 
the formation of a crater by the rupture of a high-pressure pipeline has been reported by a 
limited number of publicly available studies. The formation of such a crater can be a 
relevant event, especially if it can imply a domino effect on other parallel or crossing 
pipelines uncovered by the initial rupture, thus increasing significantly the scale of the 
accident and its consequences on people or the environmental impact (Hemmatian et al., 
2014).  
 
Published research has focused on studying the crater formation mechanism and its 
dimensions but in underground explosions of TNT (Ambrosini et al., 2002; 
Ambrosini and Luccioni, 2006; Luccioni et al., 2009; Xin-zhe et al., 2013; Krishna et al., 
2016). However, only a few studies have specifically focused on the formation of craters 
by the explosive rupture of buried pipelines. Bartenev et al. (1996) analysed accidental 
ruptures in the Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline system, which run from Turkmenistan via 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. They found a direct relationship between the rupture 
length of the pipeline and the length of the crater. Acton et al. (2010) developed a 
framework based on experimental data, for determining appropriate design separation 
distances between buried parallel gas pipelines, including the maximum dimensions of the 
crater formed by pipeline ruptures. Silva et al. (2016) analysed the ruptures of underground 
petroleum product pipelines with the formation of a crater and proposed a model to predict 
the crater width as a function of the design pipeline parameters and the soil density. Laheij 
et al. (2017) studied the minimum distances between parallel pipelines in corridors located 
in the Netherlands. Recently, Amaya-Gómez et al. (2018) proposed a probabilistic 
prediction of the crater width and depth based on NG losses of containment in underground 
pipelines.  
 
Nowadays, it is recognized the significance of historical analysis of past accidents as a 
source of valuable information on their main aspects (Lindberg et al., 2010; Kletz, 2011; 
Siler-Evans et al., 2014; Hemmatian et al., 2014; Lam, 2015; Ramírez-Camacho et al., 
2017). In this paper, a historical survey of accidents in buried NG pipelines that have 
involved the formation of a crater was carried out with the aim of analysing the crater 
formation and its influence on possible domino effect scenarios. For this purpose, 
statistical analyses were implemented to study the influence of pipeline geometric 
(diameter), operating (pressure), installation (burial depth), and accident (rupture length) 
parameters on the dimensions of the crater. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
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data was considered to develop detailed event trees for intermediate and final events 
following the accidental release of NG from pipelines. These trees delineate the domino 
sequences after the formation of a crater and estimate the probability of occurrence of these 
scenarios. The study of these accident scenarios, based on actual cases, represents a useful 
and needed advance in risk analysis of NG transportation through pipelines.  
 
In this paper, a set of 90 accidents related to the formation of craters involving 
underground NG pipelines is analysed (circumstances, crater dimensions, domino effect, 
final outcomes). The document is structured as follows: Section 2 describes how craters are 
formed. Section 3 presents the data gathered for this analysis. Section 4 describes the 
proposed methodology based on an exploratory analysis of the data gathered, which 
evaluates the influence of the pipeline parameters on the crater dimensions afterward, and 
the conditional probabilities once a loss of containment take place. Section 5 presents the 
results and discussions. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6, and finally, 
future perspectives are described in Section 7.  
 
2. Crater formation by the rupture of a buried pipeline   
 
A crater is produced instantaneously after an explosive event takes place. The explosion 
causes the fracture, compaction and plastic deformation of the soil close to the pipe. The 
result is the formation of a bowl-shaped cavity by the displacement and ejection of material 
from below the ground surface. The dimensions of the crater formed will define the size of 
the area that would be affected. In the case of the rupture of a buried NG pipeline, the 
parameters that can influence the size and shape of the crater formed are those related to 
the pipeline itself (e.g., diameter, internal pressure), and to the external conditions like the 
depth of burial of the pipeline and the soil characteristics (Tonelli and Aparício, 2005).  
 
A classic crater configuration is depicted in Fig. 1. The considered crater dimensions are 
based on those defined by Hansen et al. (1964) and Cooper (1996). Dac represents the 
apparent crater diameter, Dtc is the true crater diameter, Hac is the apparent depth of the 
crater and Htc is the true depth of the crater. Concerning the pipeline parameters, D denotes 
the outer diameter, Bd is the burial depth and Lr concerns to the length of rupture of the 
pipeline. The term "true crater" refers to the crater formed immediately after the pipeline 
rupture. Following the rupture, part of the ground ejected falls back into the newly-formed 
crater to form the "apparent crater" (final crater configuration), whilst another portion of 
ground, even sections of pipe, is expelled at a certain distance away from the rupture site. 
The true crater is deeper than the apparent crater; however, it is a hard task to make a direct 
physical measurement of the true crater in practice. For this reason, the measurements 
taken after an explosive event are those of the apparent crater.  
 
2.1. Causes and energy involved  
  
The formation of a crater can be caused by the abrupt and catastrophic rupture of high-
pressure pipeline produced by a line failure (e.g., a mechanical failure) or by the explosive 
ignition of accumulated gas leaking from a small hole in the pipe wall (a weld cracking, 
corrosion pinhole or puncture). However, the probability that the leaking gas flow through 
the soil enters the atmosphere and accidentally catches fire, explodes and ruptures the 
pipeline is very low (IGEM, 2012). Notwithstanding, if the size of the defect or puncture 
exceeds a certain "critical" length (in pipeline longitudinal direction), then the pipeline 




Whatever the cause of the pipeline rupture, the energy involved in the formation of the 
crater is different in each case. According to Peekema (2013), the rupture of a pipeline 
caused by the explosive ignition of accumulated NG leaking from a small hole would 
involve both the compression energy and the chemical energy of the gas. The latter will be 
available once the gas is present in a mixture with air (i.e., sufficient oxygen) within the 
explosion limits, together with a source of ignition. The chemical energy available from an 
explosive gas/air mixture is much higher than the compression energy in the gas; however, 
the compression energy of the gas could be diminished or, ultimately, lost when the gas 
leaked from the pipeline. On the other hand, the same author affirmed that in the abrupt 
and catastrophic rupture of a pipeline caused by a line failure, the energy involved is only 
associated with the compression energy contained in the pressurized gas, which is released 
at the moment of rupture. In this case, the escaping gas from the ruptured pipeline could 
ignite, but not “explode”, so the chemical energy of the gas would contribute to the 
subsequent fire, but not to the explosive rupture.  
 
Once the crater has been formed, the gas escaping from the broken pipeline may have a 
“scouring effect" and carry away the loose earth or the rock material that finds in its path; 
it could even eject huge fragments of the pipeline. In this way, the final crater could be 
much larger than the one formed by either of the previous causes. Therefore, the 
dimensions of the final crater may also depend on the kinetic energy of the spewing fluid 
and the duration of the scouring action (Peekema, 2013).  
 
2.2. Domino effect possibilities  
 
Once the initial rupture of a buried pipeline (P1) has formed the crater, the possibilities of a 
domino effect depend on whether a second buried pipeline (P2) lies within the crater limits 
or not, and whether it transports a dangerous fluid. Another important aspect is whether the 
gas leaking from P1 ruptured ignites or not. The different possible sequences have been 
summarized (Fig. 2). The final accidental scenarios of these sequences –pipe failure due to 
thermal impact or thermal/blast impact– have been based on the historical survey and risk 
analysis expertise (Ramírez-Camacho et al., 2015). 
 
If P2 is outside the crater's limits, then it will not be damaged either by the explosive effect 
or thermal radiation because the surrounding soil will protect it. On the contrary, if P2 is 
inside the crater formed (whether totally or partially exposed), there are two possibilities 
for it to fail. The first refers to the possibility that the explosive effect of the rupture of P1 
damages P2 (whether a puncture, a crack or a total rupture), causing its failure. In this case, 
if fluids releasing from both pipelines ignite, the resulting hazard would come from the 
thermal radiation or direct contact with flames produced by the fire. If there is no ignition, 
the gas will disperse in the atmosphere, and the soil will be contaminated if P2 transports 
another liquid. 
 
Alternatively, if the explosive rupture of P1 did not affect P2, but the releasing gas from 
the ruptured P1 is ignited, there is a probability that P2 fails due to flames impingement or 
strong thermal radiation when P2 conveys a gas. If this pipeline conveys a gas and it is not 
adequately fireproofed, the probability of failure in a rather short time is very high. 
However, if P2 conveys a high flow at high pressure, the heat transfer coefficient to 
internal fluid could be sufficient to prevent a failure. If P2 conveys two-phase flow, the 
possibility of pipeline failure due to the high temperature reached by the pipe wall should 
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also be considered. Conversely, if P2 conveys a liquid, it will act as a refrigerant and will 
cool the pipe wall avoiding its failure. In either case, the flow in P2 can be shut off if 
blocking valves are shut down; this again could lead to the pipeline failure.  
 
To prevent such domino effect scenarios, safety distances between parallel and crossing 
pipelines and their surroundings have been proposed in standard or code practices such as 
that reported for natural gas and water parallel pipelines by the Energy Commission of 
Malaysia (clearance of >300 mm) or the ASMEB31.8 (clearance of >6 in for an 
underground structure) (Mohsin et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2012). Other approaches like Silva 
et al. (2016) suggest a 10 m separation for underground pipelines based on an analysis of 
historical accidents, and PEMEX (2009) recommend a minimum separation of 1 m in the 
same ditch.  
 
3. Data collection and organization  
 
Information of ruptures of buried NG pipelines that involved the formation of a crater was 
collected from accident databases, technical reports, and accident reports. The primary 
purpose of collecting the available information is to gather all disseminated data on crater 
accidents in the pipeline natural gas transportation industry and create a reliable database, 
which may be used to improve the information and understanding about the occurrence of 
this type of events and to analyse their main characteristics statistically. The main sources 
of information were:  
 
- The Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents database (ARIA, 2015). 
- The Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing of Germany (BAM, 2009). 
- The Major Hazard Incident Data Service database (MHIDAS, 2007). 
- The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB, 2015). 
- The U.K. Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2000, 2002). 
- The U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA, 2015a). 
- The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2015). 
 
Where a record of interest was identified, the available data was stored in a database in MS 
Excel format included as supplementary material. Table 1 shows the fields used to 
organize the data, which are divided into seven blocks. The information contained refers to 
the identification of the accidents (date, location, characteristics, and causes), pipeline 
characteristics, dimensions of the craters, and consequences (injuries, deaths, evacuees). It 
should be noted that the analysis of the consequences of these accidents has not been the 
subject of this study, but rather the occurrence of a failure scenario.  
  
Table 1  
Structure of the database on accidents in NG pipelines that involved a crater formation.  
 
Block Data field Type of field Units 
1. Accident identification The ID number of the accident 
in the database 
List - 
Date of occurrence  Date DD/MM/YYYY 
Location Text - 
2. Pipeline characteristics Diameter Numeric in 
Wall thickness Numeric in 
Grade Text - 
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Block Data field Type of field Units 
Installation year Date DD/MM/YYYY 
Pressure Numeric bar 
Type of pipeline Text - 
Burial depth Numeric m 
3. Crater dimensions Length Numeric m 
Width Numeric m 
Depth Numeric m 
Area Calculated m2 
Volume Calculated m3 
4. Characteristics of the 
accident 
Rupture length Numeric m 
Distance to pipe fragments Numeric m 
Ignition Text - 
Flames length Numeric m 
Time from release to ignition Numeric min 
Time from release to shut-down Numeric min 
5. Nature of accident Causes Text - 
6. Consequences Deaths Numeric - 
Injuries Numeric - 
Evacuees Numeric - 
7. References Source of information  Text - 
Report available  Text - 
 
During this analysis, the following aspects have to be considered:  
  
- The dimensions registered in the database are those of the apparent crater; that is, the 
measurements taken after the rupture of the pipeline.  
- In Fig. 1, the "Apparent crater diameter" parameter refers to a circular crater. In 
practice, however, the shape of a crater caused by the rupture of a buried pipeline may 
not necessarily be circular, mainly due to the axial symmetry of the pipeline and the 
length of the rupture. To better organize the data, two new fields were added, “Crater 
length” and “Crater width”, replacing the previous one.  
- The "Apparent depth of the crater" parameter has been defined in the database as 
"Crater depth".  
- The database contains more information than what is discussed here. The availability 
of these data can be useful for applying risk analysis tools, generating lessons learned 
to avoid recurrence of these accidents and identifying those accidents more likely to 
occur. 
 
Relevant information for the analysis was incomplete or inaccurate in a number of the 
records extracted. To complete the missing data and to find new accident records, a 
detailed search was conducted by consulting other free-access sources that cover accidents 
in pipelines (e.g., newspaper, articles, and websites) and checking the information thus 
obtained. After applying this extraction process, a collection of 90 accidents related to the 
formation of craters by the rupture of buried NG pipelines was obtained (see Appendix 1, 
Table A.1). The records collected cover the period from 1954 to 2015. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the largest sample of such accidents gathered in peer-reviewed 
literature.  
 




Based on the 90 gathered records, this work proposed the following methodology to 
analyse possible relationships among the pipeline parameters and the crater dimensions. 
Initially, a preliminary analysis was attempted to extract trends related to the main 
parameters of the pipeline that determine the energy potential of the accident and causes. 
Therefore the pipeline diameter, the burial depth, operating pressure, and the length of 
rupture are compared. 
 
Based on these parameters, the degree of relationship between the crater dimensions 
(dependent variables) was evaluated through a correlation and regression analyses. In one 
hand, the correlation study was evaluated using Pearson correlation coefficients r. Several 
alternatives exist to compute the Pearson correlation coefficient, but in this work, the 
traditional function using raw scores and means was considered (Rodgers and Nicewander, 
1988). Besides its easy calculation, this correlation coefficient provides the direction of the 
correlation (i.e., positive or negative) and supports the selection of independent variables 
within a linear regression analysis. However, the Pearson correlation coefficient assumes 
pairwise normal variables, which are linear related, and homoscedasticity (i.e., similar 
finite variance), so the independent variables could be limited for those fulfilling these 
assumptions. Therefore, the Spearman correlation rank ρ was also compared to estimate 
the strength of the monotonic relationship between the crater dimensions and the pipeline 
parameters. The Spearman rank is not subjected to any assumption about the distribution of 
the variables, and it is invariant under monotone transformations. On the other hand, the 
regression model fit was initially determined based on two well-known numerical 
measures: the Residual Standard Error (RSE) and the adjusted R2 statistic. The first one is 
an estimate of the standard deviation of the error based on the Residual Sum of Squares 
(RSS), and the latter is a measure of the linear relationship between the variables and the 
response. In addition, Confidence Intervals (CI) were considered for the obtained 
regression coefficients following the reported in Rencher and Schaalje (2008). 
 
Finally, conditional probabilities are estimated based on the accident sequence of the 90 
records gathered. These probabilities focus on the possibility of domino effects and the 
estimation of final outcomes given a loss of containment of a natural gas pipeline. 
 
5. Results and discussion  
 
5.1. Exploratory analysis  
 
Diameter and type of pipeline  
 
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the entries in six categories, according to the nominal 
diameter of the pipelines involved in cratering accidents: D < 10 in (254 mm), 10 ≤ D < 20 
in (508 mm), 20 ≤ D < 30 in (762 mm), 30 ≤ D < 40 in (1016 mm), D ≥ 40 in, and 
unknown diameter. The pipeline diameter is known in 94.5% of cases (85 entries). Of 
these records, pipeline diameters from 20 to 40 in were the most frequently involved 
(70.6%, 60 entries), followed to a lesser extent by pipelines less than 20 in in diameter 
(22.3%, 19 entries), and more than 40 in (7.1%, 6 entries).  
 
Fig. 3 also shows the distribution of the inputs by the type of pipeline. This information is 
available in 65.6% of the cases (59 entries). Most of these events (78%, 46 cases) occurred 
in transmission lines and, to a lesser extent, in distribution (15.2%, 9 entries), and 
gathering (6.8%, 4 entries) lines. This distribution can be explained and justified by the 
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considerable length of transmission lines installed around the world, and also by the 
smaller diameter and lower operating pressure of distribution lines.  
 
Pipeline burial depth (𝐵𝑑) 
 
NG pipelines are generally installed shallow under the ground for ease of installation and 
access during maintenance or repair activities. This approach is especially advantageous 
since the ground provides a convenient mode of supporting high-pressure pipelines under 
operating conditions, as well as to protect them from exposure to natural elements (e.g., 
severe weather, ultraviolet radiation) and from human-induced risks (Wijewickreme and 
Weerasekara, 2011). However, even in buried pipelines, an inadvertent release could 
endanger human life, cause damage to property or the environment or represent significant 
costs. 
 
Fig. 4 represents the distribution of the burial depth of the pipes, according to their 
diameter and type. This information is known in 55.6% of cases (50 entries). Of these 
records, 52% of the pipelines were buried at depths between 1 and 2 m, while 26% were 
installed less than 1 m depth and 20% at a depth between 2 and 5 m. Only 2% of these 
records (one case) have a depth greater than 5 m. The latter case corresponds to the 
accident occurred on 13 February 2014 in Adair County, Kentucky (USA), where a 30-in 
(762 mm) NG pipeline buried at a depth of 9.1 m was ruptured, forming a crater 
approximately 18 m depth by 15 m width (PHMSA, 2014a).  
 
Operating pressure (𝑃𝑜𝑝) 
 
The operating pressure is one of the main parameters of the pipeline that determine the 
energy potential of the accident; however, only 73.3% (66 cases) of the cases reported this 
data. The information collected refers to the pressure at which the pipeline was operating at 
the time of the failure; however, when this data was not specified as such, the operating 
pressure of the system was taken into account. Fig. 5 illustrates that the trend is to operate 
at pressures from 40 to 70 bars (79% of known cases). It can also be observed that the 
operating pressure increases as the pipe diameter increases. Although the gathering, 
transmission, and distribution pipelines are designed and constructed to withstand much 
more pressure than the system could actually reach, it is a fact that the higher the pressure 
inside the pipeline, the more potentially dangerous it will be a loss of containment.  
 
Rupture length (𝐿𝑟) 
 
The rupture length is a parameter that requires special attention, because, due to the axial 
symmetry of the pipeline, it defines the limits of the crater –mainly along– and, therefore, 
the possible area of destruction. This phenomenon takes place in a three-stage process 
(initiation of crack, propagation of it and, finally, the total rupture of the line), which is 
defined by the characteristics of the pipeline (e.g., construction material, age) and the 
operating pressure. Andrews et al. (2004) point out that the combination of the operating 
pressure and crack opening angle can result in cracks propagating for 20 m and longer, at a 
speed of 200-300 m/s. The opening angle of the crack was not analysed in this study.  
 
Fig. 6 shows the distribution of the entries according to the rupture length of the pipelines. 
This information is known only in 50% of the cases. Most of the ruptures ranged from 1 to 
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30 m (82.2%, 37 cases), followed much less frequently by lengths between 30 and 60 
(11.1%, 5 cases), which agree with the indicated by Andrews et al. (2004). Only 2.2% of 
these records (one case) had a rupture greater than 100 m long. This case corresponds to 
the accident occurred on 21 February 1986 in Kentucky (USA), in which a rupture of a 30-
in (762 mm) gas pipeline produced a crater of 152 m long and 9 m wide from a 
longitudinal rupture of 146 m.  
 
5.2. Principal influences of the pipeline parameters on the crater dimensions  
 
The correlation results indicate that, for a significance level of 5%, there are direct or 
positive relationships between the variables (see Table 2). The values in parenthesis 
indicate the number of records with information about the parameters, which were used to 
calculate the corresponding correlation coefficients. The correlation coefficients are not 
expected to be very high, as the crater dimensions can be simultaneously affected by more 
than one parameter of the pipeline. Therefore, it is possible to determine with which 
pipeline parameters a particular crater dimension is most closely related, although the 
calculated correlation coefficients are relatively low in some cases.  
 
Table 2 
Correlation matrix between crater dimensions and pipeline parameters. Pearson 
coefficients in the lower triangular and the Spearman rank in the upper triangular. 
 
 Crater dimensions Pipeline parameters 









































































Crater length (𝐶𝑙)  
 
The result of the crater length depicted in Table 2 suggests with r close to 0.92 (𝜌 = 0.65) 
that there is a high correlation between the crater length and the length of rupture. This 
result reaffirms the claim that this parameter of the pipeline defines the limits of the crater 
in the longitudinal direction. Therefore, the relationship between these two variables can be 
expressed as follows:  
 




where 𝑘1 is a linear coefficient. Based on the available data of both variables under a least 
square approach, it was obtained that 𝑘1 = 1.15 [Std. Error = 0.06] with a 95% CI [1.03, 
1.27], the RSE is 11.96, and the adjusted 𝑅2 is 0.89. This correlation factor is similar to the 
1.02 reported by Bartenev et al. (1996). Although the value of 𝑘1 calculated here does not 
conform to some of the values quoted in Table A.1 (e.g., ID 53, 70 and 86), this inaccuracy 
could be explained by the fact that the expression of proportionality found does not take 
into account the relevant design parameters of the pipeline such as the density of the soil 
and the operating pressure, which is the driving force of the process. 
 
Crater depth (𝐶𝑑)  
 
Regarding the crater depth, from Table 2 it can be deduced that the parameter with which 
this variable has a high correlation is the installation depth of the pipeline (r = 0.804, 𝜌 = 
0.595). This result can be explained by the fact that as the depth of the pipeline increases, 
so does the confinement effect and, therefore, also increase the amount of ground material 
that can be expelled by the energy of the gas released. In other words, as the burial depth is 
increased, the crater depth also increases until a maximum is reached (Cooper, 1996). 
According to the data analysed, the underlying depth at which the most probable maximum 
sizes of the crater can occur is between 0.9 and 9 m.  
 
The relationship between these two variables can be expressed as the Eq. (2). In this case, 
the mean linear coefficient is 𝑘2 = 1.90 [Std. Error = 0.12] with a 95% CI [1.65, 2.14], the 
RSE is 1.65 and the adjusted 𝑅2 is 0.89. As in the previous case, there is also no perfect 
match of 𝑘2 with some of the values listed in Table A.1 (e.g., ID 8, 11 and 31); however, it 
should be noted that the inclusion of important variables such as soil density, operating 
pressure, and pipe diameter could contribute to improving the prediction of crater depth.  
 
C𝑑 = 𝑘2 ∙ 𝐵𝑑 (2) 
 
Crater width (𝐶𝑤)  
 
Regarding the crater width, the pipeline parameter with which it presents the “highest” 
correlation is with the diameter (Table 2). This appreciation coincides with the result found 
by Silva et al. (2016), who point out that the crater width increases based on the pipeline 
diameter. However, since in this case, the correlation coefficient is relatively low (r = 
0.454, 𝜌 = 0.534), no precise conclusions can be drawn about the influence of this 
parameter on the crater width using linear correlation factors. However, a possible 
influence can be drawn using a monotonic transformation like a logarithmic regression. 
The following expression was obtained for the crater width in this case including an 
intercept:  
 
C𝑤 = 𝑘3 ∙ 𝐷
𝛼 (3) 
 
where 𝑘3 and 𝛼 are regression coefficients associated with the intercept and the diameter, 
respectively. For the gathered records, it was obtained that 𝑘3 = 0.53 [Std. Error = 0.39] 
with 95% CI [0.24, 1.14], 𝛼 = 0.90 [Std. Error = 0.13] with a 95% CI [0.65, 1.14]. For this 
case, the RSE is 0.47 and the adjusted 𝑅2 is 0.42.  
 




Despite the results drawn with linear or power law regressions with one variable, the crater 
dimensions would be more accurately described based on the pipeline parameters using a 
multivariate approach. For this purpose, logarithmic regressions were considered because 
some features, such as the rupture length, had wider ranges (i.e., greater than 10:1). Also, 
logarithmic regressions would help to stabilize the variance and nonlinear performances. If 
𝑌 denotes the response and 𝑋 the variables evaluated, the logarithmic regression would 
have the general form of Eq. 4. Here 𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽𝑖 are the regression coefficients 
obtained from a least squares approach and 𝜖 is the associated error.  
 
log 𝑌 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 log 𝑋𝑖
𝑖
 + 𝜖 (4) 
 
A variable selection approach was used to perform the multivariate regression based on the 
Best Subset Selection approach described by James et al. (2013). This selection fits 
separate least square regressions for each combination of independent variables (or 
predictor), then all the regressions are compared to identify the best one for a given number 
of predictors. For this purpose, the R-project function regsubsets was implemented (James 
et al., 2013).  
 
Once the best predictors are selected, the best regressions were obtained based on the 
minimum RSE, maximum adjusted 𝑅2, and modified versions of the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) previously used by Amaya-
Gómez et al. (2018). In what follows, the best regressions are described in more detail, 
which in all cases omit the intercept in Eq. 4. In addition, the regression assumptions are 
evaluated using their diagnostic plots, i.e., the residuals vs. fitted values, the quantile-
quantile (q-q) plot, and the regression leverage, i.e., observation with unusual value in the 
independent variables (i.e., predictor). Also, an outlier diagnosis was implemented to 
evaluate if any register should be removed. Therefore, the studentized residuals were 
considered to identify possible outliers, which corresponds with the residual errors divided 
by their standard error. According to James et al. (2013), the observations whose 
studentized residuals are greater than 3 (absolutely) are possible outliers.  
 
Crater length (𝐶𝑙)  
 
The Best Subset selection established that the predictors that better describe the crater 




𝛽1 ∙ 𝐷𝛽2 (5) 
 
where 𝛽1 is 0.37 [Std. Error 0.07] with a 95% CI [0.22, 0.52], 𝛽2 is 0.71 [Std. Error 0.06] 
with a 95% CI [0.59, 0.83], the RSE is 0.46, and the adjusted 𝑅2 is 0.98. The logarithmic 
multivariate regression decreases the RSE significantly (from 11.96 to 0.46) and increases 
slightly the adjusted 𝑅2.  
 
Regarding the regression assumptions, Fig. 7a indicates that some records affect the pattern 
of the red line, but overall it has a flat tendency confirming the linearity assumption. Fig. 
7b illustrates that the majority of residuals lie in the diagonal, which overall satisfies the 
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normality assumption. Fig. 7c shows a moderate dispersion, which suggests that the 
independence assumption could be satisfied, but in general, more records are required. 
Finally, the regression presents low leverage as can be noted in Fig. 7d and the absolute 
studentized residual is less than 3, which indicate that there is not substantial evidence for 
the presence of outliers. Based on the aforementioned, the regression assumptions are 
overall satisfied. 
 
Crater depth (𝐶𝑑)  
 
According to the results of the Best Subset, the variables with a better prediction of the 
crater depth were the rupture length, the burial depth, and the pipeline diameter, obtaining 




𝛽4 ⋅ 𝐷𝛽5 (6) 
 
where 𝛽3 is -0.14 [Std. Error 0.07] with a 95% CI [-0.29, 0.016], 𝛽4 is 0.27 [Std. Error 
0.14] with a 95% CI [-0.016, 0.55], 𝛽5 is 0.48 [Std. Error 0.07] with a 95% CI [0.33, 0.63], 
the RSE is 0.36, and the adjusted 𝑅2 is 0.93. 
 
The diagnostic plots for this regression shown in Fig8 indicate that the linearity assumption 
is satisfied except for a couple of records (Fig. 8a), that the residuals follow a normal 
distribution (Fig. 8b), and that the residuals are mostly equally spread (Fig. 8c). This last 
result suggests that the variance does not change drastically along the fitted values and the 
data are independent. Finally, there is not significant leverage (less than 0.4), and the 
studentized diagnosis lies within -2.16 and 1.60, so there is not strong evidence about 
outliers, which in turn, confirm the regression assumptions. 
 
Crater width (𝐶𝑤)  
 
For the crater width, the Best Subset selection identifies the pipeline diameter and the 
burial depth as the parameter that better predicts this crater dimension. The following 






where 𝛽6 is 0.71 [Std. Error 0.028] with a 95% CI [0.65, 0.77], 𝛽7 is 0.20 [Std. Error 0.14] 
with a 95% CI [-0.085, 0.49], the RSE is 0.44, and the adjusted 𝑅2 is 0.97. 
 
Despite some records have a slight high residual from the regression predictions, the 
diagnostic plot in Fig. 9 confirm the regression assumptions regarding the linearity (red 
line almost flat), the normality of the residuals, independence and homoscedasticity. Also, 
Fig. 9d shows low leverage, and the studentized lied in the range from -2.43 to 2.68, which 
indicate that there is not enough evidence for outliers.  
 
5.4. Conditional probabilities  
 
The different accidental sequence can follow after the release of NG from a pipeline. For 
instance, depending on if an immediate or delayed ignition takes place, a jet fire, flash fire 
or a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) may occur. Detailed event trees have been developed 
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to provide the conditional probabilities of occurrence of the final events after the rupture of 
a pipeline and the formation of a crater, as well as of the domino effect.  
 
Final outcomes  
 
From the event tree set up for these accidents as shown in Fig. 10, it can be seen that the 
immediate ignition is not very likely, showing a probability of 0.344. Bubbico et al. (2016) 
provide an average value of 0.341 for the immediate ignition probability of compressed 
gases (with the weights being the fraction of cases of catastrophic and full-bore ruptures 
releases), which matches the value just found correctly.  
 
For releases when the cloud dispersion is almost certain (50 cases out of 90 characterized 
by the “no immediate ignition” option), a median delayed ignition probability of 50% is 
observed; furthermore, the probability of flame front acceleration is higher (80%). In 
contrast to the case of the immediate ignition probability, the obtained probabilities for 
delayed ignition and explosion based on the reported data are higher than those cited by 
Bubbico et al. (2016); that is, 0.464 for delayed ignition and 0.641 for flame front 
acceleration. 
 
Table 3 reports the overall probabilities of occurrence of the possible final events after the 
release of NG. It must be observed that since some of the final events can happen 
simultaneously, the probabilities can amount to more than 1.  
 
Table 3  
Overall probabilities for each type of final event.  
 
Final event  Overall probability 
Jet fire 0.544 
Fireball 0.100 
Flash fire 0.055 
Vapour Cloud Explosion  0.223 
Dispersion   0.278 
 
According to Table 3, in little less than a third of all the cases (specifically 27.8%), there 
were no dangerous consequences. Among the dangerous events, the jet fire is the most 
likely scenario (54.4% of occurrence), compared to 22.3% of a VCE or a 10% of a fireball, 
deriving either from an immediate ignition of the release, or generated by another 
preceding dangerous event like a flash fire or a VCE.  
 
Domino effect sequences  
 
Of the 90 accidents that involved the formation of a crater, in 31 of these accidents there 
was at least a second pipeline parallel to the failed pipeline. From these events, the 
probability of domino effect by the formation of a crater in parallel pipelines was 
estimated. The results are shown in the event tree of Fig. 11; this results should be taken 
with caution, as the number of cases is certainly reduced.  
 
According to Fig. 11, there is a high probability (0.806) that a second parallel pipeline does 
not fall within the limits of the crater after the initial rupture, i.e., that it is not affected 
either by the explosive effect or by the thermal radiation in case of fire. From the cases 
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within the crater limits, none of them failed for the explosive rupture of the first pipeline, 
which indicates that the probability that the exposed pipeline would be affected by the 
explosive rupture is negligible. This figure also illustrates that in all the cases in which a 
secondary pipeline was exposed, the gas releasing from the source pipe was ignited. From 
the six cases exposing a secondary pipeline, only one of them present a flame impingement 
at the second pipe, which would imply a conditional probability of 0.167, and a failure due 
to thermal impact. If the flames do not impinge directly on the exposed pipeline, the 
probability of failure would be close to 0.2 if it receives strong thermal radiation. The 
overall probability that a second pipe located inside the crater will fail due to the thermal 
impact of the first ruptured pipe is low. No significant conclusions can be drawn from the 
statistical point of view at the moment. However, the possibility of occurrence of a domino 
accident should not be ignored. Table 4 summarizes the information of the identified crater 
accidents that involved a domino effect in parallel pipelines.  
 
Table 4  




Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 System configuration Crater configuration 
Diameter / Burial depth / 
Pressure / Rupture length 
29/07/1995 
Rapid City, 
MB, Canada  
(TSB, 1997; 
HSE, 2000) 
42-in / 1.5 m 
/ 60.7 bar / 
10.5 m  
36-in / 1.5 m 
/ 60.7 bar / 







16-in / - / 
66.6 bar / 17 
m  
6.62-in / - / 
8.7 bar / 
0.45 m  
  
 
In the accident in Rapid City, Canada (1995), one of the six NG pipelines that make up the 
system failed. The ruptured occurred in the 42-in (1067 mm) gas pipeline as a result of 
stress corrosion cracking. The explosive event created a crater of 51 m length, 23 m wide 
and 5 m deep, which left exposed the 36-in (914 mm) pipeline installed at the same depth, 
but a 7 m distance (less than the company`s horizontal spacing standard). The heat 
overload, produced by the fire of the gas releasing from the first pipeline, caused the 
rupture and ignition of the 36-in (914 mm) pipeline. A third 48-in (1220 mm) pipeline, 
passing under the location of the first and second pipeline ruptures, was exposed to the fire 
but did not fail. The remaining three pipelines were not affected, as they did not fall within 
the crater limits. One person was injured, and the fire consumed 19,600 m3 of NG.  
 
In the accident near Buick, Canada (2012), a rupture and ignition occurred on a 16-in (406 
mm) gas pipeline due to a pre-existing hook crack. Prior to the rupture, this pipeline 
experienced a gradual pressure increase due to the accumulating gas when the system was 
temporarily shut down. The elevated pressure was sufficient to rupture the pipe along the 
























created (17 m long, 7.6 m wide and 1.1 m deep) that exposed the 6.62-in (168 mm) gas 
pipeline located nearby in the same right-of-way, but without damaging it. Approximately 
25 minutes later, this pipeline, which had also been shut down, ruptured as a result of 
overheating due to fire impingement, and the escaping gas also ignited contributing to 
feeding the fire. At the time of the ruptures, both pipelines contained pressurized sour gas. 
The fire consumed 961,400 m3 of NG, and 1.6 hectares of land were burned.  
 
Based on the information from both accidents, the regressions from Eq. (1) to Eq. (3) for 
the univariate approach, and Eq. (5) to Eq. (7) for the multivariate approach, preliminary 
predictions of the crater dimensions were estimated (Table 5). Note that the burial depth of 
the pipelines in the Buick accident was not reported, so for comparison purposes, they are 
assumed as a cover of 3 ft. (0.91 m), which is commonly implemented (ASME, 2002). The 
preliminary predictions show interesting results of the crater width and depth, bearing in 
mind that the reported dimensions account the effects from the two failures, whereas these 
predictions consider them separately. For more in-depth analyses of these accidents, please 
refer to the approach proposed in Amaya-Gómez et al. (2018). The records and correlation 
factors proposed in this paper can be used to identify preliminary domino effect scenarios 
based on some safety distances. For these cases, a rupture centered at P1 would uncover P2 
because the half of predicted width is greater than the separation between the two pipelines 
(i.e., 12.77 m for Rapid City and 5.01 for Buick accidents). 
 
Table 5  
Comparisons of the predicted confidence intervals of the craters for the domino effect 









Univariate prediction Multivariate prediction 
C𝑙 (m) C𝑑 (m) C𝑤 (m) C𝑙 (m) C𝑑 (m) C𝑤 (m) 
Rapid 
City** 





















































*Assumed as 3 ft. ** 𝐶𝑙 = 51m, 𝐶𝑑 = 5m, and 𝐶𝑤 = 23m. ***𝐶𝑙 = 17m, 𝐶𝑑 = 1.1m, and 𝐶𝑤 = 7.6m. 
 
Nevertheless, safety distances in domino effect scenarios depend on the escalating effects 
from the primary system (Alileche et al., 2015), so these separations should consider the 
minimum distance at which escalating events are avoided. In the case of natural gas, they 
will be delimited by the extension of the flame envelope (Flash Fire); the flame length and 
its direction (Jet Fire); or the overpressure associated with the explosion energy (VCE) 
(Alileche et al., 2015). Therefore, further analyses are required to estimate a safe distance 
as the approaches reported in Sklavounos and Rigas, 2006 and Mohsin et al. (2014) for Jet 
Fire scenarios, which are the most probable events.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Failures of buried pipelines are accompanied by the formation of a crater that may pose 
risks to the surrounding people and environment. The crater may expose parallel or 
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crossing pipelines, which in turn, could trigger a domino effect scenario. Considering the 
NG increasing relevance in pipelines, a database of 90 real accidents was gathered to study 
possible prediction parameters for the crater dimensions. The database attempts to reduce 
this existing gap for the natural gas transport by pipeline. Until now, a complete record of 
crater accidents occurred in this type of facility has not been found. The data collected 
serve as a reference and contributes to keeping understanding the hazards and evaluating 
risks in the transport of natural gas through pipelines.  
 
Despite the limited number of records obtained, linear relationships could be determined 
for the length, depth, and width of the crater. Also, conditional probabilities were 
determined once a loss of containment is assumed for buried pipelines, including the 
possibility of a domino effect scenario. The analyses of the data suggest that most pipes 
were installed at a depth from 1 to 2 meters (about 52%); pipelines tended to operate at 
high pressures (between 50 and 70 bars), and the most likely length of a pipe rupture 
varied between 1 and 30 meters. 
 
Data analysis allowed us to obtain relationships to describe the influence of the pipeline 
parameters (which also determine the energy potential of the rupture) on the dimensions of 
the resulting crater. According to the cases analysed, the length of the crater caused by the 
rupture of a pipe is linearly proportional to the length of the break by a correlation factor of 
1.15. Similarly, the depth of the crater is linearly proportional to the installation depth of 
the pipe by a correlation factor of 1.89. Regarding the width of the crater, it was found that 
the diameter of the pipe is the parameter with which it has a more significant correlation; in 
this case, the correlation factor obtained is 0.68 in a power law expression.  
 
The conditional probabilities of the branches of the post-accident event trees associated 
with NG have been calculated from historical records; due to the reduced number of cases, 
these results should be taken with caution. The overall probability of a safe conclusion (but 
implying a certain environmental impact) for an accidental release is about 30%. A jet fire 
represents the most dangerous final event, with an occurrence probability close to 55%. 
Outcomes characterized by large impact areas, such as VCE, fireballs and flash fires, are 
less likely.  
 
Although the number of domino accidents identified in parallel pipelines has been low, the 
intuitive hypothesis that the formation of a crater may lead to a domino effect has been 
quantitatively confirmed. According to the data found in the literature, there is a 
probability in parallel pipelines of 0.194 that a second pipeline is inside the crater and, 
therefore, that it is subject to a certain risk of a domino effect. In this case, the probability 
of a pipeline being affected (i.e., broken) by the thermal load generated by the fire of the 
initial rupture is 0.064. While this probability is low, the reader should bear in mind that 
this analysis does not consider the effect of the soil in the crater predictions (this aspect 
will be investigated in future studies), so the occurrence of a domino accident should not 
be ignored.  
 
7. Future directions  
 
The results obtained can be beneficial to establish adequate separation distances in the 
design and construction of parallel pipes. Indeed, the objective is to avoid any damage to 
other pipes in case the rupture of one of them implies the formation of a crater and, 
consequently, being able to avoid the domino effect, so interesting approaches like the 
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reported by Nessim et al. (2004) can be used to support the design and assessment of 




Bd Pipeline burial depth, m 
𝐶𝑑 Predicted crater depth, m 
𝐶𝑙 Predicted crater length, m 
𝐶𝑤 Predicted crater width, m 
D Pipeline outer diameter, in 
Dac Apparent crater diameter  
Dtc True crater diameter 
Hac Apparent depth of the crater 
Htc True depth of the crater 
𝑘1 Length linear regression coefficient  
𝑘2 Depth linear regression coefficient 
𝑘3 Width linear regression coefficient associated with the regression intercept  
Lr Length of rupture of the pipeline, m 
Pop Pipeline operating pressure, bar 
R2 Coefficient of determination  
𝑟 Pearson Correlation coefficient  
𝛼 Correlation factor associated with the pipe diameter  
𝛽𝑖 Multivariate regression coefficients  
∆𝐻 Difference between the depth of the true crater and the apparent crater. 
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Diameter (in) / 
Thickness (in) / Grade / 
Installation year / Type 
of pipeline / Pressure 
(bar) / Burial depth (m) 
Apparent crater dimensions Rupture 





























Toledo, OH, USA 
16 / - / - / - / T / 27.6 / - 18.3 2.4 3 35 276 - / - No None - / 30 MF 0 / 0 / - - Toledo 
Blade, 1954 
2 18/06/1961 
Laurel, MS, USA 
36 / - / - / - / T / - / - 9.1 9.1 6.1 65 1060 - / 183 Yes - - / - - 10 / 0 / - - Evening 
Independent, 
1961 
3 19/11/1961  
Warrenton, VA, USA 






24 / 0.25 / X46 / - / - / 
54.6 / 1 
23 9 4.5 163 1950 8.2 / 107 Yes - Immediate / 
45-60 




Austin, TX, USA 
10.8 / 0.373 / - / - / - / 
36.9 / 1 
3.05 3.05 - 7.3 - - / No 
fragments 
Yes - 10-15 / 22 MF 2 / 6 / - - HSE, 2002 
6 02/01/1974 
Illinois, USA 
22 / - / - / - / T / - / - 18.3 - 4.6 - - - / - Yes 45 - / - - - / - / - - Star-News, 
1974 
7 02/03/1974 
Monroe, LA, USA 
30 / 0.438 / X52 / - / T / 
56 / 1.95 
30 9.1 7.6 215 4346 12 / - Yes - Immediate / 
85 




12 / 0.25 / - / - / T / 34.9 
/ 0.76 
13 5.2 3 53 425 2.4 / 30 Yes 100 8 / 75 C 0 / 3 / 0 - HSE, 2002 
9 21/05/1974 
Meridian, MS, USA 
6.6 / 0.071 / - / 1970 / G 
/ 21.1 / 0.9 
3 3 1.8 7 34 - / No 
fragments 
Yes 100 20 / - C 0 / 6 / - - MHIDAS, 
2007 
10 09/06/1974 
Bealeton, VA, USA 
30 / 0.312 / X52 / - / T / 
50.5 / 1 
36 11 2.1 310 1740 17 / 91 Yes - Immediate / 
55-105 
C 0 / 0 / 0 - HSE, 2002 
11 09/08/1976 
Cartwright, LA, USA 
20 / 0.25 / - / 1949 / T / 
54.1 / 0.6 
13.7 7.6 3.05 82 665 - / - Yes 60 Immediate / 
40-60 





Diameter (in) / 
Thickness (in) / Grade / 
Installation year / Type 
of pipeline / Pressure 
(bar) / Burial depth (m) 
Apparent crater dimensions Rupture 






























21 / - / - / - / D / - / - 91.4 - 6.1 - - - / - Yes - - / - MF 11 / 52 / - - MHIDAS, 
2007 
13 11/11/1979 
Monroe, LA, USA 
20 / - / - / - / T / - / - 21.3 21.3 6.1 355 5796 - / - No None None / - - 0 / 0 / 
Yes 
- Daily Kent 
Stater, 1979 
14 04/11/1982 
Hudson, IA, USA 
20 / 0.281 / X52 / - / T / 
57.7 / 0.9 
19.5 15 2.75 230 1685 19.2 / 13.7 Yes 100 Immediate / 
65 




28 / 0.276 / DIN 2470 / 
- / T / 67.5 / 1 




- / - / - / - / D / - / - 4.6 4.6 - 17 - - / - - - - / - - - / - / - - MHIDAS, 
2007 
17 25/11/1984 
Jackson, LA, USA 
30 / 0.311 / X52 / 1955 
/ T / 71.4 / 0.9 
27.5 7.6 3 164 1310 - / - Yes 100 Immediate / 
Immediate 
TPA 23 / 5 / - X HSE, 2002 
18 10/03/1985 
Ignace, ON, Canada 
36 / 0.36 / - / - / - / 66.5 
/ - 
27 10.6 3 225 1800 22.5 / - Yes - - / - - - / - / - - HSE, 2002; 
BAM, 2009 
19 27/04/1985 
Beaumont, KY, USA 
30 / 0.469 / X65 / 1952 
/ T / 69.7 / 1.8 
27.5 11.6 3.7 250 2470 9 / - Yes - Immediate / 
146 
C 3 / 5 / - X HSE, 2000  
20 20/08/1985 
Lowther, ON, Canada 
36 / 0.36 / - / - / - / 67.9 
/ - 
28 - 4.9 - - 9.4 / 320 Yes - - / 
Immediate 
C - / - / - - HSE, 2002 
21 21/02/1986 
Lancaster, KY, USA 
30 / 0.375 / X52 / 1957 
/ T / 69.4 / 1.8 
152 9.1 1.8 1085 5215 146 / - Yes - Immediate / 
40 




36 / 0.36 / - / - / - / 62.6 
/ - 




12.7 / 0.252 / 5LX / 
1957 / - / 47 / 1.2 
4.6 1.5 1.7 5.5 25 - / No 
fragments 
No None None / 165 TPA 0 / 0 / 
Yes 




30 / 0.36 / - / - / - / 63.1 
/ - 
49 33 7 1270 23700 25.5 / - No None None / 8 C - / - / - - HSE, 2002 
25 08/12/1991 
Cardinal, ON, Canada 
20 / 0.252 / - / - / - / 
63.4 / - 





Diameter (in) / 
Thickness (in) / Grade / 
Installation year / Type 
of pipeline / Pressure 
(bar) / Burial depth (m) 
Apparent crater dimensions Rupture 





























Potter, ON, Canada 
36 / 0.36 / Polyethylene 
/ 1973 / T / 69 / 0.9 





36 / 0.752 / - / - / T / 48 
/ 3 












Maple Creek, SK, 
Canada 
42 / 0.427 / X70 / 1982 
/ T / 83.2 / 1.5 
22 - - - - 21.9 / 125 Yes - Immediate / 
120 
MF 0 / 0 / 0 X HSE, 2000 
30 23/03/1994 
Edison, NJ, USA 
36 / 0.675 / X52 / 1960s 
/ T / 68.2 / 3.7 
43 20 4.3 675 7745 23 / >244 Yes - Immediate / 
150 
TPA 112 / 0 / 
1500 fam 




36 / 0.36 / X65 / 1972 / 
- / 69 / 0.9 
36 16 4 452 4826 21.8 / - Yes - - / 4-38 C 0 / 0 / 0 X HSE, 2000 
32 12/07/1995 
Ukhta, Russia 
56 / - / - / - / T / - / - 15.3 15.3 4.9 184 2400 - / - Yes - - / - - - / 12 / - - MHIDAS, 
2007 
33 29/07/1995 
Rapid City, MB, 
Canada 
42 / 0.371 / X65 / 1973 
/ - / 60.7 / 4 
51 23 5 920 12280 10.5 / 90 Yes - Immediate / 
22 
C 1 / 0 / - X TSB, 1997 
34 15/04/1996 
St. Norbert, MB, 
Canada 
34 / 0.5 / 5LX / 1965 / 
D / 50 / 1.3 
17 13.5 5 180 2403 6.3 / 40 Yes - 14 / 44 MF 0 / 0 / 1 
family 
X HSE, 2000 
35 12/07/1996 
Sermenevo, Russia 
- / - / - / - / - / - / - 8 8 2 50 270 - / - Yes - - / - - 0 / 2 / 0 - MHIDAS, 
2007 
36 19/08/2000 
Carlsbad, NM, USA 
30 / 0.335 / X52 / 1975 
/ T / 47 / 2.1 
34.4 15.5 6 420 6700 14.9 / 87.5 Yes - Immediate / 
Immediate 
C 0 / 12 / 0 X NTSB, 2003 
37 07/12/2000 
Jal, NM, USA 
16 / - / - / - / - / - / 1 8 7 3 45 352 - / - Yes - Immediate / 
- 










Diameter (in) / 
Thickness (in) / Grade / 
Installation year / Type 
of pipeline / Pressure 
(bar) / Burial depth (m) 
Apparent crater dimensions Rupture 































12 / - / - / 1979 / - / - / 2 5 5 - 20 - - / - Yes - - / - - 0 / 0 / - - HInt Dossier, 
2005 
40 15/03/2002 
Iron C., MI, USA 
36 / 0.375 / X65 / 1968 
/ T / 51.7 / 2 
36.6 9.1 9.1 262 6350 24.4 / - No None None / - - 0 / 0 / 0 X DOT, 2002 
41 11/06/2002 
Easton, CA, USA 
16 / - / - / - / - / - / 1.3 10 10 6 80 1260 - / - Yes - - / - TPA 0 / 0 / - - HInt Dossier, 
2005 
42 30/11/2002 
Brunswick, GA, USA 
8 / - / - / - / D / 17.2 / - 3 3 1.5 7 28 - / - No None - / - - - / - / - - HInt Dossier, 
2005 
43 02/02/2003 
near Viola, IL, USA 
24 / 0.312 / X52 / 1949 
/ D / 56 / - 






Eaton, CO, USA 
24 / 0.25 / X60 / 1978 / 
T  / 56 / 3.7 
30.5 15 6 360 5750 30.5 / - Yes - - / - - 0 / 0 / 3 
families 
- BAM, 2009 
45 01/05/2003 
Pierce C., WA, USA 
26 / 0.281 / - / 1957 / T  
/ 43.6 / 1 






Toledo, WA, USA 
26 / 0.281 / - / 1957 / T 
/ 35 / 1 
- 15.4 - 186 - - / - No None None / - C 0 / 0 / 4 
families 
- HInt Dossier, 
2005 
47 25/03/2004 
Woodward, IA, USA 





40 / 0.512 / - / 1991 / T 
/ 80 / 1.1 
10 10 4 80 840 - / 150 Yes - 45 / - TPA 132 / 24 / 
- 
X BAM, 2009 
49 12/04/2005 
Jefferson, AR, USA 
- / - / - / - / T / - / - 12 6.7 0.6 63 100 - / - No None - / - - - / - / - - MHIDAS, 
2007 
50 30/06/2005 
Douglas C., KS, USA 
20 / 0.312 / - / 1929 / T 
/ 36-47 / 0.6 
6.1 6.1 - 30 - 4.6 / 45.7 No None None / 110 MF 0 / 0 / 4 X PHMSA, 
2012a 
51 01/12/2005 
Chicago, IL, USA 




Cass C., MI, USA 
24 / - / - / 1950s / D / 
55.2 / 1 






Diameter (in) / 
Thickness (in) / Grade / 
Installation year / Type 
of pipeline / Pressure 
(bar) / Burial depth (m) 
Apparent crater dimensions Rupture 































6 / - / - / - / - / 70 / - 5 2 2 8 42 - / - Yes - - / - - 1 / - / - - BAM, 2009 
54 25/08/2008 
Pilot Grove, MO, 
USA 
24 / 0.281 / X48 / 1937 
/ T / 55.2 / 1.8 




30 / 0.344 / X52 / 1955 
/ T / 55.1 / - 






48 / - / - / 1970s / T / - / 
2 




Palm City, FL, USA 
18 / 0.25 / X52 / 1959 / 
T / 58.9 / 1.1 
35.5 5.2 2.8 145 1083 32.3 / 7.6 No None None / 120 C 3 / 0 / 
Yes 
X NTSB, 2013 
58 05/05/2009 
Rockville, IN, USA 
24 / 0.312 / B / 1940 / T 
/ 54.6 / - 
18 8.5 - 120 - - / - Yes - - / - C 0 / 0 / 49 
families 
X DOT, 2009 
59 10/05/2009 
Moscow, Russia 
36 / - / - / 1976 / - / - / 
2.5 
10.5 5 - 41 - - / - Yes 100 - / - MF 5 / 0 / 
Yes 





36 / 0.4 / X65 / 1973 / - 
/ 68.7 / 0.9 
6.1 6.1 - 30 - - / 150 Yes - Immediate / 
7 
C 0 / 0 / 4 
families 
X TSB, 2009 
61 05/11/2009 
Bushland, TX, USA 
24 / 0.25 / X52 / 1948 / 
T  / 53 / 1.5 





San Bruno, CA, USA 
30 / 0.375 / X42 / 1956 
/ T / 25.9 / 0.9 
21.9 7.9 - 136 - 8.5 / 30.5 Yes - Immediate / 
95 
OHE 58 / 8 / 
300 fam. 




30 / 0.312 / X52 / 1948 
/ T / 46.3 / 1.5 
4.6 4.6 - 17 - 1.3 / No 
fragments 






E. Bernard, TX, USA 
24 / 0.5 / X40 / 1947 / T 
/ 49.6 / 1 
30.5 7.6 - 182 - 3.7 / 90 No None None / 
Immediate 






36 / 0.36 / - / 1972 / - / 
66.2 / 0.9 
17 13 - 173 - 9 / >100 Yes - Immediate / 
15 





Diameter (in) / 
Thickness (in) / Grade / 
Installation year / Type 
of pipeline / Pressure 
(bar) / Burial depth (m) 
Apparent crater dimensions Rupture 






























Gillette, WY, USA 
30 / 0.438 / X70 / 2010 
/ T / 92.4 / 0.9 
27 7.5 2.7 160 1145 25 / 21 No None None / 85 MF 0 / 0 / 0 X PHMSA, 
2012b 
67 14/11/2011 
Nuevo León, Mexico 
36 / - / - / - / T / - / - 20 20 5 315 4190 - / - Yes 15 - / - TPA 1 / 0 / 0 - El Universal, 
2011 
68 16/11/2011 
Glouster, OH, USA 
36 / 0.344 / X60 / 1993 
/ T / 52.5 / - 





Batesville, MS, USA 
24 / 0.25 / X70 / 1944 / 
T / 51.6 / 3.7  





Marengo C., AL, 
USA 
36 / - / X60 / 1964 / G / 
54.8 / - 
24.2 16.8 4.3 320 3661 - / 61 Yes 30 Immediate / 
17 




30 / - / - / - / - / 59 / - 20 20 7 315 5864 - / - Yes - - / - - 9 / 1 / - - Kraus, 2014 
72 25/04/2012 
Hinton, IA, USA 
24 / - / - / - / - / - / - 30 10.7 9.2 252 6185 - / - Yes 90 - / - TPA 2 / 0 / - - The Gazette, 
2014 
73 06/06/2012 
Laketon, TX, USA 
26 / 0.25 / X52 / 1957 / 
- / 47.4 / - 
18.2 5 - 72 - 15.2 / - Yes - Immediate / 
- 
- 0 / 0 / 0 X PHMSA, 
2012c 
74 28/06/2012 
Buick, BC, Canada 
16 / 0.25 / X52 / 1960 / 
G  / 66.6 / 0.5 
17 7.6 1.1 102 300 17 / 20 Yes - Immediate / 
Previously 
shutdown 




20 / 0.281 / X60 / 1967 
/ T  / 64.1 / - 
22.9 10.9 4.3 195 2250 11.5 / 12.2 Yes 30 Immediate / 
>60 
C 0 / 0 / 0 X NTSB, 2014 
76 20/08/2013 
Pittsburg C, OK, USA 
20 / - / - / - / - / - / - 9.1 9.1 6.1 65 1060 - / - Yes - - / - - 0 / 0 / 0 - NewsOn6, 
2013 
77 08/10/2013 
Harper C., OK, USA 
30 / 0.344 / X52 / 1954 
/ T  / 55.8 / 1.5 






36 / 0.465 / - / 2008 / T 
/ 92 / - 
50 15 5 590 7854 - / 130 No None None / 745 MF 0 / 0 / 0 X TSB, 2013b 
79 29/11/2013 
Houstonia, MO, USA 
30 / 0.312 / X60 / 1962 
/ T  / 61.6 / 1 








Diameter (in) / 
Thickness (in) / Grade / 
Installation year / Type 
of pipeline / Pressure 
(bar) / Burial depth (m) 
Apparent crater dimensions Rupture 































30 / 0.37 / X52 / 1960 / 
- / 63.3 / - 
24 12.5 3 236 1885 14.4 / 100 Yes - Immediate / 
- 
MF 0 / 0 / 5 
families 
X TSB, 2014 
81 13/02/2014 
Adair C., KY, USA 
30 / 0.323 / X65 / 1965 
/ T / 66.3 / 9.1 





Marshall C., WV, 
USA 







8.6 / - / - / 1976 / - / 34 / 
1 
4 4 1.5 13 50 - / - No None None / - MF - / - / - - ARIA, 2014 
84 26/05/2014 
Warren, MN, USA 
24 / - / - / - / T / 56.9 / - 9.1 9.1 4.6 65 800 - / 36.6 Yes 30 - / - - 0 / 0 / 10 
families 
- DRC, 2014 
85 27/06/2014 
E. Godavari, AP, 
India 
18 / - / X60 / 2001 / - / 
44.1 / 5 











Brandon, MS, USA 
30 / 0.375 / X52 / 1952 
/ T  / 52.9 / - 
9 8 - 57 - - / - Yes >60 - / - MF 0 / 0 / - X PHMSA, 
2015b 
88 29/01/2015 
Bowling Green, MO, 
USA 
42 / - / - / 2008 / T / - / - 6.1 6.1 - 30 - - / - No None None / - MF 0 / 0 / 50 
families 




Fresno, CA, USA 
12 / 0.254 / X42 / 1962 
/ D / - / 1.1 
6.1 5.6 2.2 27 157 0.8 / 6 Yes 45 Immediate / 
- 
TPA 13 / 1 / - X Exponent, 
2015 
90 03/08/2015 
Falfurrias, TX, USA 
16 / 0.25 / X42 / 1947 / 
- / 57 / - 




Type of pipeline = T: Transmission, D: Distribution, G: Gathering.  
Cause of failure  = C: Corrosion, MF: Mechanical failure, OHE: Operational/human error, TPA: Third party activity.  
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FIGURE CAPTIONS  
Fig. 1.  A cross-sectional view of a crater formed by the explosive rupture of a buried pipeline 
(adapted from Hansen et al., 1964 and Cooper, 1996).  
Fig. 2. Domino effect sequences following a crater formation by the rupture of a buried NG 
pipeline.  
Fig. 3. Distribution of entries according to the diameter and type of pipeline.  
Fig. 4. Distribution of entries according to the depth of burial of the pipelines.  
Fig. 5. Distribution of entries according to the operating pressure of the pipelines.  
Fig. 6. Distribution of entries according to the length of rupture of the pipelines.  
Fig. 7. Diagnostic plot log(𝐶𝑙) ∼ log(𝐿𝑟)  + log(𝐷).  
Fig. 8. Diagnostic plot log(𝐶𝑑) ∼ log(𝐿𝑟)  + log(𝐵𝑑) + log(𝐷).  
Fig. 9. Diagnostic plot log(𝐶𝑤) ∼ log(𝐷) +  log(𝐵𝑑).  
Fig. 10. Event tree for the release of NG from a ruptured buried pipeline.  
Fig. 11. Event tree of the domino effect sequences following the formation of a crater. 
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a Fire heating will increase pressure and could increase pipe wall temperature. 
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Final event Probability (*)  
        Yes 0.344     Jet fire 22/31 = 0.710 0.244 
 31/90   Fireball + Jet fire 9/31 = 0.290 0.100 
NG pipeline 
rupture 
   Yes 0.800 VCE 5/20 = 0.250 0.056 
  Yes 0.500 20/25 VCE + Jet fire 15/20 = 0.750 0.167 
f (90 events)   25/50 No 0.200 Flash fire 2/5   = 0.400 0.022 
No 0.556   5/25 Flash fire + Jet fire   3/5   = 0.600 0.033 




  25/50   







Initiating event  Second pipe 
inside the crater 
Second pipe 
damaged by the 
first rupture  











Accidental scenario Probability 
          
  Yes 0.000        Pipeline failure 
(Explosive impact) 
0.000 
  0/6      
  
   
Yes 1.000   Pipeline failure 
(Thermal impact) 
0.032 
  Yes 0.167 1/1   
    1/6  Yes 0.000  Possible pipeline failure  
(Thermal impact) 
0.000 
Pipe rupture and 
crater formation  
Yes 0.194    No 0.000 0/0  
6/31    0/1 No 0.000  
No outcome  0.000 
   Yes 1.000  0/0  
  6/6    Yes 0.200 Possible pipeline (Thermal 
impact) 
0.032 
   Yes 1.000  1/5 
f (31 events)  No 1.000  No 0.833 5/5  No 0.800 
No outcome  0.130 
 6/6  5/6   4/5 
    No 0.000   
No outcome  0.000 
     0/5   
   No 0.000     
No outcome  0.000 
   0/6     
 No 0.806       
No outcome  0.806 
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 The catastrophic rupture of a buried pipeline can create a crater.  
 The formation of a crater is a relevant event due to its destructive potential.  
 In parallel pipelines, the formation of a crater can lead to a domino effect.  
 Influence of the pipe parameters on the resulting crater has been evaluated.  
 Results obtained can be used to support distances between parallel pipelines.  
